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The Airline Maintenance Mechanic

THE AIRCINE MAINTENANCE MECHANIC EDUCATIONAL LNFRASTRUCTURE:
SUPPLY, D E M D , AND EVOLVING WDUSTRY STRUCTURE

Robert N. McGrath and Blaise P. Waguespack

There is an encroaching crisis in the supply and demand of aviation maintenance labor. This paper reports
results of a survey of FAA-licensed A&P schools and a survey of airlines and major maintenance outsourcing
firms. Results largely confirm general expectations. Further analysis found indications of an impending
shakeout in the extant training idi-astructure.Strategies centered on tapered vertical integration are offered
as an admittedly imperfect industry-wide solution.
Trends in the civil air transport (airline) industry make clear
that rapid growth is practically inevitable. Because of factors
such as the spread of fie-market philosophies and the
consequent globalization of industries in general, it has been
predicted that the total miles flown will rise rapidly in the
foreseeable future ("Service," 1998). This has driven a rise in
demand for new aircraft, but the rising demand for new
aircraft far exceeds the manufacturing sector's ability to keep
up, and many airlines now ordering new aircraft must wait
years for delivery ("Manufacturing," 1998). Consequently, the
already aged and continuously ageing worldwide fleet will be
taxed by an increasing number of operating hours and cycles
which, in addition to number of aircraft and preventive
maintenance requirements, are main strategic predictors of
aircraft maintenance (Friend, 1992).
Looking ahead in t m s of maintenance, then, it at first
seems f m t e that a state of immense industry maintenance
fscilrty overcapacitycurrently exists, and will continue to exist
(Ionides, 1999). By one estimate, the current worldwide
demand for maintenance senices is about 58 million laborhours, while the industry is actively providing about 77
million, with a current possible total capacity of 155 million
labor-hours in the industry is available. In the year 2005,
demand is forecasted to be about 79.5 million labor-hours,
while total industry capacity will still exceed 181 million
labor-hours (McKenna & Scott, 1997).
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But apparently, cclabor-hours"as a measure of industry
capacity has more to do with physical plant than actual labor.
Forecasts also indicate that over the same period, the supply
of mechanics with Air&ame and Powerplant (A&P)
Certificates might become very strained, with some areas
already reporting diEculties finding skilled mechanics and
(Gallacher, 1999; Shay, 1999). W e ihe growth in
demand for A&Ps between now and 2004 is estimated to be
close to 34,000, atlrition alone is expected to be about 40,000
(Jackman, 1996). Though there is probably enougb training
capacity to support the industry, it is less certain that the right
structure of incentives exists to draw in the needed new
technicians in the near h e . Also, these aggregate figures do
not take into account obvious heterogeneities in supply and
demand such as match-ups among, for example, specific skills
of individuals and related requirements of specific
organizations.
Thus, ironically, airline maintenance organizations as well
as independent providers of outsourced Maintenance, Repair
and Overhaul (MRO) services, Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs),and other recent entrants into the
MRO field look to become squeezed by the pressure to
achieve and maintain high rates of asset utilization (in periods
of overcapacity, typically accomplished through lowering
one's prices), and the pressure to maintain desired levels and
types of maintenance skills and resulting service quality. What
this shortage forebodes is a supplier's market w k e the price
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of maintenance labor will likely be bid upwards. In other
words, maintenance organizations will likely find themselves
competing with each other for the right technicians
(exacerbatingtheir direct and some indirect labor costs,) while
at the same time the prices these providers will be able to
charge their customers for maintenance services will
simultaneously be pressured to fall as long as aggregate
maintenance overcapacity exists. This condition, of course,
will be present in an environment that is already very
competitive in more ordinary terms ("MRO Competition,"
1996).
In the United States, at least, many people feel that
unrestrained fiee market forces will ultimately resolve
dilemmas of this type. For example, one might assume that
the coming dsparity between the demand for maintenance
labor and its supply will bid up the average wage for
maintenance services, and that this should directly incentivize
a correct rate of entry by people of the right skills fiom the
general working population, and that labor supply and demand
will equilibrate in textbook fashion, right on time. On the
other hand it could also be argued that airworthiness is
something of a public good, and that an optimal strategy for
the airline industry at-large would involve innovations that
improve the productivity of the existing workforce. Such
changes could include equipment upgrades @lanes and
engines) that improve the reliabilities of the equipment and
decrease the need for basic maintenance, andlor make
proactive improvements to the existing industry training
idfastructure that produces maintenancetechnicians.
In short, it is perhaps the case that conditions of poor,
problematic, or just heterogeneous maintenance quahty
among maintenance providers in the airline industry do not
enhance overall industry vitality. At some point in the debate,
many feel that cooperation, rather than (or in addition to)
canpetition, is a more enlightened tack. Indeed, it has become
plain that in some aspects of business, cooperation through
hsimnents such as consortia, alliances, and more permanent
forms of partnering has become popular, profitable, and
conducive to the greater socioeconomic good, even in areas
traditionally earmarked by stiff competition (Philips, 1997).
These perspectives are obviously arguable, even among
professional economists and public policy practitioners. It is
not the authors' immediate purpose to participate in a
theoretical advancement of the argument, but to accept the
reality of the encroaching problem and present the initial
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results of a research collaboration between two institutions in

the airline industry maintenance training idiastructure.
Observing developments in this collaboration, even fiom the
earliest phases, will h o p e m contribute to the ongoing
resolution of the labor shortages and skill heterogeneity in the
industry. After all, the best managers foresee problems and
have solutions ready when difliculties arrive.
THE STUDY
Researchers in the Business Administration Department at
Embry-RiddleAeronautical University were approached by
a major U.S. airline to help investigate the nature of a
forecasted shortfall of Ahfiame and Powerplant (A&P)
mechanics, expected to become especially critical for that
airline around the year 2000. At that time the airline expects
that about 25% of the maintenance workfbrce will attrit or
retire; especially retire, meaning that the proportion of
experience lost would be even worse. Up to 42% of related
management could be lost. These trends were known to be
determined by internal labor market factors which were
largely beyond any realistic control, so management at the
airline opted to search for howledge about external patterns
which could contain opportunities for innovative solutions.
The research was lead by a Professor of Marketing and
BusinessResearchMethods, who organized graduate students
enrolled in an MBA in Aviation course, into teams which
performed highly structured telephone surveys. The survey
instruments were developed in consulation with: (1) the
airline, represented by a former line technician and A&P
holder now a financial analyst and a representative fiom the
Human Resources department specializing in technician
employment (2) a Professor of Strategic Management who is
an instructor in the area of Aviation Maintenance Mangement
and former Air Force Oacer responsible for engine
maintenance programs; (3) students in the class, which
included two A&P holders, one an avionics instructor at the
university and (4) and a review of the applied and trade
literature.
Two telephone surveys were conducted in the Spring of
1998. The first queried airlines as well as major providers of
outsourced aircraft maintenance. Participants were identified
before the research began on the basis of market share and
total volume in consultation with the airline representative.
The general purpose was to ascertain current A&P labor
conditions and associated expectations. This was a survey of
some of the present and futuredemand characteristics of A&P
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labor.
The second survey queried institutions granting A&P
certificates and conducting related maintenance training
consistently over a period of 20 years. FAA Advisory
Circulars since 1979 were canvassed for this purpose, the
latest being AC 147-2DD issued in March 1997. The general
putpose was to (a) rea&m the FAA census,and (b) ascertain
the nature of the current maintenance training infrastructure.
This, in essence, was a survey of some of the characteristics
of the supply of A&P labor. Results are described in the
following section.

RESULTS
The folowing caniers agreed to participate in the survey of
A&P labor demand:
Alaska Airlines
American Airlines
America West Airlines
Continental Airlines
Delta Airlines
DHL Airways
Northwest Airline
Southwest Airlines
Trans World Airlines
United Parcel Service
US Airways
Air Tran Airways
Hawaiian Airlines
Midwest Airlines
Reno Air
Horizon Air
Ever~een
Business Emress
The following maintenance providers (outsourcing firms)
also agreed to participate:
Aero Corporation
Aircraft Support and Parts
Avtec
Midcoast
Pemco
Santa Barbara Aerospace
T W O

Aero Union
Associated Air Centre
Hamilton Aviation
Mobile Aerospace
BF Goodrich Aerospace
Commodore Aviation

With respect to the survey of A&P labor supply, it was of
immediate interest that not all schools identified in FAA
Advisory Circulars were still in operation. First, it was noted
that while'one authoritative source indicated the presence of
220 schools (United States Department of Transportation&
FAA PSDOT & FAA], 1993), only 185 were listed in the
most recent FAA circular. Ofthese 185 schools, 164 agreed
to participate. Two declines to participate, three were exiting
the training industry because of low enrollment, and the
remainder could not be contacted.
In participating in the survey, there was some slight
variation in which firms answered which questions. In other
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words, participation was enthusiastic, but not all firms would
or could hazard an answer to each question. However,
summary participation in each question was very high, so
slight variations do not threaten the modest purposes of this
Paper.
Table One and Table Two presents results of both surveys.
Some edrhng of the questions was needed to be concise here,
but the tables capture the intent of each question as asked on
the survey hstmment The Tables present the questions in the
order they were asked during the phone interview. Information
not indicated in the tables (as noted) is as follows.
In the survey of demand ('Table One), in question 4 @o you
confer A&P licenses?), it was interesting that three carriers
required trainees to successfully complete training within a
specified time frame; specifically, two carriers required
comuletion within six months. and one within 18 months.
Four outsourcingh n s that conferred A&P licenses also gave
trainees deadlines; specifically; one required completion
within six months, two within 12 months, and one within 24
months. With respect to questions five and six, firms were
permitted to spec@ more than one main source of A&P
applicants, and more than one target of A&P recruiting, so
percatages total above 100.With respect to questions 11, 12,
and 13, participants were encouraged to make additional
comments. Ofthose fums that chose to commenf criticisms
of new hires (question 1l)'tended to focus on overall
inexperience, low skill levels, and lack of needed specialized
skills. Comments about other noticeable problems (question
12)tended to focus again on lack of experience, and a lack of
avionics and electrical skills. Further elaborations (question
14) repeated these themes, plus evidenced general concerns
about present supplyldemand imbalances (overall A&P
shortages), devolving skill levels, and the siphoning off of the
best talent to the largest operators.

SURVEY ANALYSIS
Demand. Even a cursory examination of the questionnaire
data yielded interesting results. First, and as probably would
be erqpected,the airlines were much larger organizationsthan
the outsourcing firms,measured as the mean number of
mechanics and A&Ps; 2,8 17 mechanics and 1,920 A&Ps for
the airlines to 318 mechanics and 203 A&Ps, for the
MROfhms. hportantly, such a difference in size is indicative
of an imbalance in the bargaining power for labor, much
favoring the airlines.
Standard statistical tests were used to gain a better
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understanding of the differences in other data. Percentages of
yeslno m e r s were evaluated as tests of standardized
fiequencies using the chi-square statistic (Lapin, 1981).
Differences between population means were evaluated by
employing the Student t statistic, in a method specifically
suited for small sample sizes. The most conservative
assumptions were made; i.e., tests were two-tailed (Lapin,
1981).
The airlines and the outsourcing firms were found to be
significantlydifferent in the following ways. On balance, the
pattern indicates that the airlines are willing to exercise their
bargaining power:
Question 1: In contrast to what the large
differences in means (2,817 v. 3 18, and 1,920 v. 203) might
intuitively indicate, airlines employed mechanics at only a
slightly higher rate (t = 2.25, greater than the threshhold of
2.048 at alpha = .25). The rate at which the two groups
employed A&Ps was, actually, very marginally nonsigdicant (t = 1.90, ~2.056).While the means indicated an
extreme difference, in other words, small sample sizes and
wide variances around the means made the "apparent," wide
differencesbetween statisticallynon-signdicant.
Question 2 : Outsourcingfirms were slightly less
likely to perceive self miliciency (at df = 1 and alpha = .05,
the chi-squared threshold was 3.841; chi-squared = 4.00).
Question 3 : The airlines were much more highly
unionized (chi-squared = 43.12).
-- Question 4: Airlines were much more likely to
require applicants to possess licenses (chi-squared = 43.12).
Question 5: Because of the "in-house" category
(1 1% for airlines and 42% for outsourcing firms), the main
source of job applicants was likely to be different (at df = 4
the threshold was 9.488; chi-squared = 19.36).
-- Question 6: Because of the "VoTech category
(61% for airlines and 25% for oursourcing firms), recruiting
patterns were likely to be different (at df = 8 the threshold was
15.507; chi-squared = 38.55).
Question 7: The airlines were more likely to
require a written employment exam (chi-squared = 33.76).
Question 13: Oursourcing firms were slightly
more likely to foresee an increase in the future demand for
A&Ps (chi-squared = 6.18).
Question 16: Outsourcing firms were slightly
more likely to have plans for conducting in-house training of
A&Ps (chi-squared = 6.40).

--

--

---

----
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The two populations were not found to be
sigmticantly different in terms of
-- Question 2: The number of additional A&Ps
needed (t = 1.67, <2.160).
Question 8: Requirements for a practical exam
(chi-squared = .04).
Question 9: Requirements for a probationary
period (chi-squared = .30).
-- Question 10: Base and overtime pay (t= 1.08 for
both parts, <2.056 and 2.093, respectively).
Question 11: Perceptions of problems with the
skills and knowledge of new-hires (chi-squared = 4.50).
Question 12: Perceptions of other problems with
new-hires (chi-squared = 1.56).
Question 13: Percentage increase in A&Ps
forecasted (t = 1.56,<2.056).
-- Question 15: The presence of training
partnerships and alliances (chi-squared= 1.54).
Question 17: Percent of applicants passing initial
job screening (t = 1.16, ~2.048).

-------

Supply.Refening to the results of the questio~airew e n to
the Part 147 Schools (Table Two), it was interesting that an
overwhelming number of schools provide what seem to be
generalist A&P licenses, in the sense that almost 85%
c a n f d only A&P li-,
while much smaller percentages
offered only an "A," a "P," or all three possibilities of A, P,
and A&P. More telling, perhaps, was that only about 28%
t a i l d their programs to speci6c clients; and here, it is worth
nolingthat most of this percentage was really only "specific"
to categories of clients (such as airlines or general aviation),
not specific organizations. In light of the demand described
above, such an aggregate lack of focus could indicate a
suboptimal degree of "closeness to the customer," or
comhationwith the needs of the consumers of maintenance
labor -- despite a contradictory conclusion which might be
inferred from noting that about half maintained training
partnershipS/alliances,and internshipslco-op programs.
There were signs of stability and uniformity in the training
infrastructure. Over 90% of new A&Ps were evidently
coming fiom a concentration of three m& sources: in order,
Community Colleges, VoTech schools, and Universities.
Almost two-thirds of the sample were state-supported.Again,
about half had internshiplco-op programs, 88% offered
h c i a l asistanceprograms, and 9 1% offered job placement
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assistance. Most (85%) foresaw an increase in future
enrohent.
More worrisome was the variation in exam pass rates and
rates. The exam pass rate varied fiom 15% to loo%,
with a mean of 92.2%. The attrition rate varied fiom 0% to
90%, with a mean of 19%. The observer is immediately
compelled to speculate as to some of the possible causes of
suchvariatian, given the high level of guidance and oversight
provided by the FAA. For example, some schools could be
much more H c u l t than others for a wide variety of reasons;
andlor schools could vary considerably in their quality. Or
large heterogeneities could exist in student populations,
though this seemsmore doubtfid. Other reasons could exist as
well. Otherwise, there were additional signs of fkagmentation
and wide variation in the training infrastructure. Most telling
was that the largest school was delivering about 350 A&Ps a
year, or about .03% of the 11,000 A&Ps which enter the field
annually ("Pilots," 1993). Most other schools were much
smaller stiU. Very few, then, could be theoretically ascribed
much bargaining power, but it must be conceded that it might
be senseless to allude to the bargaining power of schools since
individuals, not schools, bargain for the sale of maintenance
labor. On the other hand, it is within the first author's
professional interest to be well aware of just how much
common sense A&P trainees employ in making careful and
calcuhhg evaluations of which schools are worth attending,
so the point is much the same.
One-fifth of the sample was tuition-driven; tuition ranged
widely fiom $500 to $32,000, with a mean of about $6,864.
The duration of programs ranged fiom 10 months to 60
months, with a mean of 22.4 months. Experience in training
in aviation maintenance ranged from 1 to 70 years, with a
mean of 3 1.3. Class sizes ranged fiom about 4 to 50; some
schools employed only part-time instructors, while other
schools employed only full-time instructors. However, it
might be a matter of perspective as to whether these
conditions represent a lack of coordination and
standardization, or merely a healthy variety. If the latter is
assumed, however, then it becomes puzzling why only 28%
tailor their programs to specific clients.
DISCUSSION
This paper opened with a general description of the muchimproved health of the aviation industry as a whole, but
quickly pointed to an impending shakeout in MRO because of
a squeeze between intense pressures to economize versus

escalating labor costs. The data suggests that the training
infrastructure, as well, may be poised for a similar shakeout,
or at least a rationalization and restruc!m-ing. The reasoning
follows, with alternative strategiesfor its management.
Though the demand for A&P mechanics may become
critical in the future, that situation has not yet arrived. In the
near-term, it looks as if maintenance schools will continue to
struggle for enrollment. The finding that 85% of schools
foresee an increase in near-texm enrollment may contain an
optimistic bias. At least, the airlines and maintenance
outsourcing fums were not nearly as optimistic that they
would be able to satisfytheir future needs. Of course, it may
simply be that the demand is rising faster than the supply is
rising (but that both are indeed rising), which would
accommodate everyone's predictions.
But another (or additional) possibility is to fist note that the
number of schools has begun to decline. The recent
population of schools may have been as high as 220 (USDOT
& FAA, 1993). In 1994 the number of reported Part 147
schools was 193. That number has since decreased and the
most recent data indicated 185 schools remaining, and the
phone survey found two more schools poised to exit. So if the
demand for technicians is rising, the decline in the number of
schools warrants an explanation.
Understanding some of the more classic dynarmcs of
industry evolution helps (Porter, 1980). When
industriedmarkets are growing, it is normal for individual
f m s to do what is necessary to grasp larger portions of
market share, or to at least keep up with industry growth at
least in absolute terms. However, when industrylmarket
growth eventually subsides, and providers of resources to that
market continue to expand, the aggregate capacity in the
supply of resources eventually exceeds aggregate market
demand, leaving the supplier industry at-large in a condition
of overcapacity. Wdiugup a stable market among providers
who, on average, have more capacity than the market has
demand, leaves providers in a bad cost crunch. Earlier, it was
described how MRO firmsare in such a situation.
Very similar forces apply to the training inf.?astructure that
supplies MRO with labor; except a shakeout due to poor
cap*
dkation looks like it will be caused by the scarcity
of raw materials (students), rather than a paucity in demand.
But there is more. Conditions are changing in ways that
suggest that the major employers of A&Ps are not willing to
settle for poorly trained mechanics, almost no matter how
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scarce they might become.
Classically, when "buyers" (in this case, airlines and
outsourcing firms) are sophisticated (as, apparently, are
recruiters and human resourcespersonnel) and can make h e tuned assessments of the VALUE of resources being acquired
(in this case, new A&Ps), two generic types of firms (in this
case,schools) tend to survive; firm that are poised to deliver
high-quality,
high.-differentiated, high-value-added
products/services, and those that are poised to undercut
everyone else in terms of cost, and generaIly price (Porter,
1985). The providers (schools) which can not deliver either
high-qdtylhigh-maentiation-at-a-g-price, OR a lowcost, ostensibly low-price gdservice, are positioned to fail
and exit. In short, buyers (airlines and other consumers of
maintenance labor) should be expected to rationalize-out the
overcapacity (of schools) over time, forcing the relatively
poor value-adders (mediocre schookr) to exit.
This may be what has already begun to occur in the A&P
training Sastructure. As the supply of people entering the
A&P field falls, but as the demand rises, increasingly
sophisticated reading efforts of the airlinedothers should be
expected to target what each firm,given its challenges and
strategy, will deem appropriate value in a new-hire. One can
not assert with much confidence that airlines and major
outsourcing firms will do nothing about the impending labor
crisisexcept preparing to outbid one another. Wisely focusing
on value, not volume, at least some will be keenly interested
in hirjllg only the best mechanics, adjusting to remaining labor
inadequacies by substituting inferior-quality labor for
technological improvements in the inherent maintainability of
equipment (and, ultimately, dispatch reliability), andfor by
making managerial innovations that improve the productivity
of the maintenance workforce.
In other words, the nature of the demand indicated in these
m e y s indicates that buyers of maintenance services are not
interested in just getting "warm bodies." Respondents
consistently voiced as much, if not more, concerns about the
shills and competencies of future technicians as about the
potential number of technicians. As one might expect, the
airlines, firms with deeper pockets and better bargaining
positions for labor, showed less anxiety than the outsourcing
firms. Several long-tenn results of this situation should be, to
those who have faith in the invisible hand of the forces behind
supply and demand, that (a) on the demand side, there will
continue to be a siphoning-off of the best talent to the airlines
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and other areas where the need for maintenance labor is highly
concentrated in pwerful firms (consolidating, global players
in MRO, OEMs, etc.), and @) on the supply side, either the
highest-quality, or themost cost-effective schools (or perhaps
both, if ingeniously managed) should sunrive an encroaching
shakeout which, as stated, may have already begun. In the
long run, the high-costhigh-value-adding schools may
gravitate to serving the airlines, while the low-cost schools
may gravitate to general aviation and less-wealthy aviation
segments.
It is arguable, however, whether this is socioeconomically
optimal. Maybe the best mechanics should go to the firms
with the greatest exposure to the general public, and that this
should actually be encouraged. Or, one might argue, ordinary
market dynamics should be left to sort it out, and that there
should be no additional institutional creation impeding equal
access to labor markets. In a way, the issue seems to revolve
around equality (equal access), and equity (fairness on all
accounts), which can not be decided here.
At any rate, schools may be individually correct that future
enrollment will increase, but if this is mostly because other
schools are simply exiting the training ~astructure.The
situation may not necessarily be that the total supply of
mechanics will increase, or that the benefits will be equitably
disstbuted throughout the industry. But,as some schools and
institutions leave the field, others now see a chance for their
enr011ements to increase.
Short of being able to significantly alter the aggregate
number or the quality of the people interested in becoming
aviation mechanics, the authors suggest that one way to
embark upon a less painful rationalization of the extant
t r h g infrastructure is for the demand-side to consider
verticallbackward integration, or at Ieast tapered or quasiintegration, and for the supply-side to do some keen analysis
of the value they individuallydeliver, and hone products to the
demands of most likely buyers, for example through more
focused curricula and partnering (complementary forward
integration).
Baclcward integration refers to any decision aimed at
restructuring an arrangement with me's suppliers that
attempts to reduce supply-related uncertaiuties. Outright
aqukhon of one's supplier is one example, as is deciding to
enter the upstream business through internal growth. Of the
known possible benefits of vertical integration, some that
seem to especially pertain to the present situation include:
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economies of combined operations, improvement in the
ab&y to trust the supplier, greater economy of monitoring the
supplier for adherence to expectations, better assurance of a
steady flow of supply, a reduction in overall slack, reduction
in purchasing costs and bargaining, better capital utilization,
enhanced ability to fine-tune and differentiate the overall
productfservice,and full capturing of the profitability of the
supplier. Potential costs include: increased operating leverage
(too many eggs in one basket), reduced flexibility to
environmental change, capital investment Qustifling hurdle
rates and opportunity costs of capital), foreclosure of
alternative sources of supply, maintaining balance in potential
capacity differentials, dulled marketlconsumer incentives of
a captive relationship, the distractioddilutim of managerial
talent and organizationalcompetencies, and the possibility of
a "bad apple" phenomenon, or the vulnerability to
contamination of one organization by another organization's
inferior performance standards (Porter, 1980).
But organizations are apt to partially, as well as fully,
integrate backward when the combinations of benefits and
costs suggest it. Tapered integration generally refers to a
strategy of becommg one's own supplier, but not supplying all
of one's own demand (as opposed to full integration).
Potential advantages include a lower elevation of fixed costs,
reduced risks of locking-in to one supplier, the maintenance
of some market discipline on the captive supplier, the
development of a detailed understanding of relevant costs, and
the ability to still externalize the risks of fluctuations in
demand (Porter, 1980). For example, an airline could acquire
an existing Part 147 school (and in impending conditions, at
a very attractive price), or open its own training academy, to
fulfill its minimum forecasted needs for maintenance labor,
accommodatingupswings in business cycles through external
recruiting meanwhile tailoring the academy's program to
the specific operational requirements of the airline, and
making efficient use of everyone's time and other resources.
Quasi-integration has a similar intent, but generally refers to
a mutual investment (hence financial stake) between firms
who share a common goodwiU, and who contact each other
frequently in the natural course of their relationshqs.
Advantages, again, can be found in various cost economies,
the absence of any necessary exclusive commitment to either
supply or purchase, and a lower overall capital investment.
For example, a major consumer of maintenance labor might
directly invest in an existing school, technically maintaining

--
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its business independence but otherwise enjoying the benefits
of a very high level of cooperation and coordination, all
lubricated most importantly by mutual goodwill.
Given the mutual goodwill that obviously exists between the
training ~astructureand its customer base, quasi-integration
might be the theoretically more correct paradigm to pursue.
Obviously, since each consumer of maintenance labor is
potentially idiosyncratic, and as there seems to be so much
variation in the supplier base, permutations of solutions are
almost endless. It is left to individual strategists to consider
their own requirements.
In addition to achieving firm-level benefits, the industry as
a whole might benefit from a trend towards forward and
backward integration. Overall training capacity could be
maintained, instead of severely shaken-out and generally
injured in the short-term, to the detriment of being able to
satisfy long-term growth in demand. But remaining capacity
could be rationalized around, and tailored to, the specitic
needs of buyers, on a case-bycase basis, rather than providing
an undershd population of genedkts who apparently are not
optimally valuable new-hires.
However, caveats are c e r k d y in order as well. As stated
ealier, a a d toward integration could leave the consumers of
maintenance labor who do not have the ability to integrate in
an only greater predicament. General aviation and tked-base
operators may become particularly strained, or economically
locked-outfimn fair access to the high-costlhigh-value adding
schools, settling to recruit at what has sometimes been
referred to as the "diploma mills" ("A Greater," 1996).
CONCLUSION
Globalization will continue to change the structure of the
aviation industry at many points of value-addition throughout
its complete supply chain. Educationltraining is a supplier
industry that is just as vulnerable to the forces of supply and
demand as its downstream customers. In addition to
globalization drivers, the simple scarcity of a key resource
skilled labor will shape industry restructuring as well.
l'roponentsof "free madcet" solutions should be aware that the
smartest entrepreneurs respond proactively to foreseeable
changes; they do not wait for gross dis-equilibria to trigger
reactive equilibration, at serious socio-economiccost.

--

--
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Table One - Survey of Airlines and MRO Firms: Demand Survey
Oukmrced Maintenance Firms n

1. How many mechanics are currently employed?
How many licensed A&Ps are employed?

Airlines
Min. Max Mean Median
45 11,0002,817 750
38 9,960 1,920 630

s'
2. Is the number of A&F

Yes - 50%; No - 50% 18

Yes - 36%;

Mean Max Mean Median
13 450 96 22.5
8

Min Max Mean Median
4
800
180 100

7

3. Is maintenance unionized?

Yes - 65%; No - 35%

17

Yes - 8%; No - 92%

12

4. Do you require applicants to have an U P license?
If not, do you train A&Ps (gant licenses)?

Yes-89%;No- 11%
1 of2&

18

Yes - 42%; No - 92%
2of7train

12

5. What are the sources of A&Pjob applicants?
(respondents asked to check all that applied)

Military
VoTech
College
In-house

18

67%
50%
42%
42%
12%

suflicient for present needs?

If not, how many more A&Ps do you need?

Other
6. What is the main target of U P recruiting?
(respondents asked to check all that applied)

67%
50%
39%
11%
22%

n

Min. Max. Mean Median
18
17

13
8

1,086 318 222.5
600 203 100
No - 64%

12
11
11

Newspaper
Trade Fair
HI@ School
VoTech
Corn.. Coll.
University
Military
Agency

Other
7. Do you require a written employment exam?

Yes - 44%; No - 56%

18

Yes - 8%;No - 92%

12

8. Do you require a practical employment e m ?

Yes - 24%; No - 76%

17

Yes - 25%,No - 75%

12

9. Is there a probationary period for new-hires?

Yes - 94%; No - 6%

18

Yes - 92%; No -8%

12

If yes, how long in (months)?

Min. Max Mean Median
3
6
4
3
18

Min. Max. Mean. Median
2.5 6
3
3
12

10. What is the sh-hg A&P base pay ($/hr.)?
What is StamngA&P overtime pay?
9
11. Do you have problems with skills & knowledge
Of new-hires?

9.50 19.00 13.00 13.20 18
15.00 29.00 21.00 20.38 12

9.00 16.00 12.00 1125
13.50 24.00 19.00 20.00

10

Yes - 61%; No - 39%

18

Yes - 75%; No - 25%

12

12. Are there any other noticeable problems?

Yes - 33%; No - 67%

18

Yes - 25%; No - 75%

12

13.Do you foresee an increase or decrease in number of
A&Ps needed in the U.S. airline indusby?
If yes, by what %?

Yes - 94%; No - 6%

18

Yes - 100%; No - 0%

10

Min. Max. Mean Median
10 50 20
15

10
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3.5
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14
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18
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14.[Qualitative descriptions of concerns]

See text.

15.Do you maintain A&P training lxalnerships/aUiances?

Yes - 17%; No 83%

18

Yes - 25%; No - 75%

12

16.Do you have plans for in-house,formal A&P training?

Yes - 11%; No - 89%

18

Yes - 25%; No - 75%

12

17.What % of applicants pass initial job screening?

Min. Max. Mean Median
3
90
44 36
18
3
95
44 50
13

18.What % of applicants identified as quahfied are hired?

JAAER, Spring 1999
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See text.

-

Min. Max. Mean Median
3
80
31
20
1
100 60 70

12
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Table 2 - Survey of FAR Part 147 Schools: Supply Survey
1. Which FAA AMT licenses do you confer?

M a m e Powerplant
62%
7.48

2. Classification of your program.

High School
VoTech
Comm. College
University
Other

4.88%
32.32%
39.63%
18.29%
4.88%

3. m o r source of funding.

State Govt.
Federal Govt.
Tuition
Industry

65.89%
3.88%
20.93%
4.88%

4. Duration of A&P program (in months).

Min.

Max.

10

60

4

50

500

32,000

Additional fees?
If yes, how much?

Yes - 80%;
30

No - 20%
2,950

8. Fimgcial aid available?

Yes - 88%;

No - 12%

9. Internships/Co-ops offered?

Yes - 45%;

No - 55%

10. Do you offer job placement assistance?

Yes - 91%;

No - 9%

11. Is the Fogram tailored to specific clients?

Yes - 28%;

No - 72%

12. A&P exan pass rate.

Min.

Max.

15%

100%

13. Athition rate.

0%

90%

14. Years of experience training aviation maintenance.

1

70

15. How many students successfully complete annually?

5

350

16. Do you foresee an increase or decrease in enrollment
In the next three years?

Increase - 85%
Decrease - 7%
No change - 8%

5. A&P student/facultyratio.

Mean
22.6

6. Number of full-time instructors
Number of part-time instructors

7. Tuition (excluding dorm ($).

Page 42
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol8/iss3/8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.1999.1225

6,862

Mean.
92.2%
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